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BRICKER-DIRKSEN AMENDMENT
By KENNETH C. SEARSt
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recommended the adoption
of a resolution to amend the Constitution of the United States. It concerns
treaties and other international agreements; but it differs from other versions of what is called the Bricker Amendment. Senator Dirksen of Illinois
appears to have been the person who secured an agreement of a majority
of the committee in submitting the present text as follows:
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which
conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force
or effect."'
While there are two additional sections, as noted, Section 1 is the only
section that is worthy of any appreciable debate. Before it is made a part
of the Constitution of the United States there should be an announcement,
as clear as it is humanly possible to state it, of the purposes that its advocates seek to accomplish. Since there have been decisions of the United
States Supreme Court as to the validity of treaties and of legislation to
enforce them, the .voters should be informed which of these decisions will

be rendered ineffective as precedents upon the adoption of section 1, supra.
The sponsors should be entirely frank and intellectually honest. There
t Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School.
1S. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1956). Senator Kefauver submitted a dissenting report and Senator Hennings later submitted a separate dissent in part 2 of the report.
There are two additional sections of the Bricker-Dirksen proposal. Section 2 provides:
"On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty, the vote shall be
determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against shall
be entered on the Journal of the Senate." This was not a part of the resolution submitted by
the majority of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on June 15, 1953 but a similar provision was a part of the Knowland and subsequent proposals. It is a provision that is not
very important because there has been no observed denial that the requirement could be made
a part of the rules of procedure in the Senate without amending the Constitution. Frank E.
Holman, ex-President of the American Bar Association, who appears to have been the
real father of the "Bricker Amendment," stated that this provision "could be accomplished
by a mere change in Senate rules." HOLMAw, STORY OF Tim 'Basc=Rxa A mNarm
at 47 (1994).
However, the Dirksen report, states: "While it has been suggested that a rule such as
here proposed be made a part of the Senate rules, such action could not prevent the waiving
of such rules by a unaminous consent agreement." S. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1956). Query: Suppose that the rule for yeas and nays prohibited a waiver by unanimous
consent. Would that be sufficient to prevent a waiver? Consider, also, that a treaty ratification
by a voice vote with not a single voice objecting to the waiver of the roll call could hardly be
anything other than a non-controversial treaty.
Section 3 of the Bricker-Dirksen proposal is the customary limitation: "This article
shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission."
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should be no place in this effort to secure an amendment for face-saving
purposes or for personal prestige, or as balm for wounded feelings.
The experience in this country with the Fourteenth Amendment should
make its citizens wary of broadly-phrased constitutional amendments
which are not as clearly understood as possible. The interpretation of a
constitutional amendment will be uncertain at best. Hence, the proponents
should strive for precision. The Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments have presented problems that had to be
settled by the courts but all of them presented reforms that were relatively
clear, as compared with the Fourteenth, which is still the basis for a strange
mixture of clashing views of vast significance. Judicial legislation to a
limited extent appears to be inevitable as long as there are courts which
interpret the Constitution. But such legislation can be largely controlled
by care in the drafting of constitutional amendments.
It is not believed by the writer that the Bricker-Dirksen proposed
amendment is as clear as it should be. The report of the majority of the
Committee on the Judiciary is not convincing as a frank statement of what
it is expected that the proposal will accomplish. Whether this is a fair
criticism can be determined only by considering the previously decided
cases and the previous exhortations to adopt the "Bricker Amendment" in
1953 and 1954.
Previously Decided Cases
In the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783 there was a provision
that permitted British subjects to sue American citizens for debts. In
Ware v. Iylton2 such a suit was brought. The American citizens, who
were also citizens of Virginia, defended by invoking a Virginia statute
which provided in such a case that a debtor could discharge his debt by
paying into a state loan office the amount claimed. It appears that the
defendants followed the statute by making payment in state paper currency. It also appears that this paper money was not the equivalent of
good British money, commonly called "sterling money." The Supreme
Court held that the treaty provision nullified the Virginia statute and destroyed the payment made under it.
In Hopkirk v. Bell' the Supreme Court of the United States likewise
held that a Virginia statute of limitations had been rendered ineffective
in the particular instance by the same treaty of peace.
There are at least three decisions that have sustained as effective,
23 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
3 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806).
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treaty provisions which granted aliens the right to succession of property
contrary to statutes of states.4
In 1911 the United States and Japan proclaimed a treaty, which provided that Japanese citizens in this country could engage in trade on the
same terms as our own citizens. But the city of Seattle in 1921 passed an
ordinance that prohibited an alien from engaging in business as a pawnbroker. The Seattle ordinance was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Washington5 which may have been the victim of local feeling against Orientals prevalent at the time on the West Coast. However, to the credit of the
United States Supreme Court, this decision was overruled. 6 It is desirable
to have a national court supreme on questions arising under treaties. It is
believed that such a court is more likely than an elected state court to
express the national interest.
In 1923, Anderson, a citizen of Denmark, but a resident of Iowa, died
leaving his mother his sole heir. She was a citizen and resident of Denmark.
The Iowa Code provided for an assessment of an inheritance tax of ten
per cent on Anderson's property. There would have been no such tax if
the mother had not been a non-resident alien. The Supreme Court of Iowa
4 See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), 51 Micn. L. REv. 1001, 1005; Santorivcenzo v.
Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Chirac v. Chirac,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
THE REcoRD or THE AssociATioN or T= BAR OF T=E C=TY OF NEW YORK Vol. 8 No. 9
(Dec.. 1953) stated: "The Government's brief in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) lists over
50 treaties now in force relating to reciprocal inheritance rights."
See, also, Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1813), well
discussed in Chaffee, Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REV.345, 361
(1952). Feidler and Dwan, Re Extent of the Treaty-making Power, 28 GEO. L.J. 184 (1939).
5 Asakura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 86, 210 Pac. 30 (1922). The Supreme Court of Washington observed but did not decide "Whether a treaty making power can impair or destroy the
police power of a sovereign state."
6
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 322 (1924). One argument made by Seattle was this: "If
Congress and the President cannot enact a statute which violates the Tenth Amendment, how
can the President and the Senate, together with some alien minister or other diplomatic representative, enter into a treaty which has that effect?" Missouri v. Holland was referred to skeptically and distinguished.
The June 1, 1956 NAT omAL VOTER, published by the League of Women Voters of the U.S.,
comments upon statutes of South Carolina and Alabama requiring "those who deal in Japanese
goods to display signs to that effect. Japan has formally protested that these statutes discriminate against its textile goods and thus violate the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Japan." Assuming that the United States could
enjoin the enforcement of these statutes, would the Bricker-Dirksen proposal, if adopted,
prevent such action?
On September 7, 1956, thirty-one nations signed a new anti-slavery convention, but the
United States abstained. Why? There was speculation that the State Department was afraid
of reviving congressional support for the Bricker Amendment. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
August 16, 1956, p. 17A and September 7, 1956, p. 5C.
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held that the Iowa Code did not conflict with a treaty with Denmark made
in 1826 and renewed in 1857. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed this decision, holding that the treaty should be "interpreted
with that liberality demanded for treaty provisions," and that the "the
treaty-making power is independent of and superior to the legislative
power of the states" and "must prevail over inconsistent state enactments."'
So far there have been presented five classes of state statutes which
were held to be unenforceable because they conflicted with orthodox
treaties. Thus, the all important question is presented: do the proponents
of the Bricker-Dirksen resolution desire to have these decisions overruled,
in effect, by their proposal, viz., S.J. REs. I of the 84th Congress? If they
think that some but not all of these decisions are contrary to "any provision"
of the United States Constitution, they should inform the voters which
are disapproved by them and which are not.
Report of JudiciaryCommittee
There appears to the author no "provision" that could be involved
except as Mr. Justice Holmes stated in Missouri v. Holland' "some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment." Thus, it
becomes important to examine the report of the judiciary committee which
purports to explain the Bricker-Dirksen resolution. This report - S. REP.
quoted brief statements from
No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)four opinions of the Supreme Court. In these statements appear these
expressions: (1) federal jurisdiction cannot be enlarged under the treaty
making power; (2) a treaty may not violate the Constitution of the United
States; and (3) the treaty power cannot change the character of the
government in one of the states. Then the report proceeds thus:
"However, confidence in this dicta from decisions of the Supreme Court
has been undermined by dicta to the opposite effect in some of the more
recent Court cases, and by the advent of an effort by some in positions
of authority to use the treaty power as an instrument for the alteration of
purely domestic policy rather than as an instrument of contract between
sovereign nations."9
A discussion of Missouri v. Hollandfollows and on page 3 of the Report
is this conclusion:
"The Supreme Court decided in that case, that the treaty making power
was not limited by the 10th amendment which reserves all rights not
7Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
8 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
9 S.REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1956).
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expressly ° delegated to the United States by the Constitution to the states
respectively or to the people. Insofar as that decision relates to the first
section1 1 of this amendment, however, the concern is not with the conclusion reached but rather with the expressions used in the course of the
opinion." (Footnotes added.)
On page 6 of the Report appears additional discussion of the expected
effect of Section 1:
"Section 1 of this amendment removes any possible doubt whether a treaty
must be consistent with the Constitution. It gives unequivocal constitutional effect to early judicial dicta not yet incorporated in binding decisions
that no provision of an international agreement which violates the Constitution or which is inconsistent with the nature of the Government of the
United States or of the relation between the States and the United States
shall be valid (New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 736; The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 620-1; Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 243;
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267; and see Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S.
332, 341). The inferences drawn by some persons from Missouri v. Holland, cited supra, and U.S. v. Curtiss-WrightCorporation,also cited supra,
that the treaty power is unlimited in any field of alleged international concern, regardless of the Constitution, will be unqualifiedly negatived, and
any doubt on this score forever put to rest.
"While some argument has been made that such dicta as contained
in the Cherokee Tobacco case, cited above, and the case of Geofroy v.
Riggs, also cited above, that the treaty power does not authorize what
the Constitution forbids, should abate all fears on the subject, the fact
remains that statements in the opinions of the court in the cases of Missouri v. Holland, supra, and U. S. v. Curtis-Wright Corporation,supra,
go in the opposite direction of an unlimited treaty power."

Comment on Senate Report No. 1716
It is submitted that these utterances do not inform a reader whether
Section 1, if adopted as an amendment of the Constitution, would render
Missouri v. Holland impotent as a ruling decision, or whether it would
then be possible for a successful attack to be made upon the enforcement
of the statute concerning migratory birds. Those interested in the protection of such birds, it is believed, would regret such a result. The impression
that the author has obtained from the quoted passages is that those who
drafted, and perhaps those who merely signed, S. RnP. No. 1716 recognized
the widespread belief that the treaty and legislation involved in Missouri v.
Holland are desirable and generally approved by Americans; and that it
would be a political error to condemn the decision in that case. However,
10 The word "expressly" was italicized by the author because it does not appear in the
Tenth Amendment.
11 It is well to remember that the "first section" is the only one that is of any appreciable
importance.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

they seem to be anxious to prevent another effective treaty that by logical
reasoning would belong in the same category. Such seems to be the difficulty
that "States-Righters" have with their vague political creed.
A very noticeable omission from the majority portion of S. REP. No.
1716 is that none of the cases placed in the five examples, supra, of powers
exercised by the national government by virtue of the treaty section of the
Constitution, is discussed, except for a quotation of one sentence from
Hauenstein v. Lynham." This quotation affords no justification for a
proposal that may be interpreted, if adopted, to overrule valuable decisions.
That is to say, they are valuable if one will concede that the United States
of America should have the power to make treaties that in the national
interest will override statutes of states to the contrary, as provided in the
second paragraph of Article VI of the Constitution. In any event, the
voters are entitled to know whether it is intended by the supporters of
Section 1, supra, to thereby render ineffective as precedents the decisions
commencing in 1796, as cited in notes 2 to 8, supra, inc.
The only perceived difference between the precedents cited in notes 2
to 7 inclusive and Missouri v. Holland, cited in note 8, is this: Missouri v.
Hollandwas a case that came to the Supreme Court in a dramatic way, viz.,
after Congressional legislation, enacted before the treaty had been made,
was held unconstitutional in some courts as beyond the granted powers of
the national government, and therefore contrary to the 10th Amendment.
Then after the treaty was ratified, essentially the same legislation, as far as
constitutional principles were concerned, was sustained. This result, however, was a manifestation of the following reasoning which seems to the
author to be proper. The treaty power is specifically granted to the national
government and specifically forbidden to the states.13 The agreement with
Great Britain was a treaty. As such the Congress had the power to enforce
it under the necessary and proper clause. All of which is not to say that some
of the provisions of the Constitution are not limitations upon the exercise
of the treaty power just as there are limitations upon the formidable war
power. 4 But the Supreme Court has not yet decided that the exercise of
the treaty power with or without enforcing legislation has exceeded this
specifically granted power. Advocates of the Bricker Amendment are unwilling to take a chance with the solutions that may be worked out by the
Supreme Court of the United States over the years ahead. The rest of us,
12 Later there is a quotation from, but no specific discussion of, Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S.
332 (1924).

13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; art. II, § 2.
14
Duncan v. Kahanamoka, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944);
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1920); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.

(4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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however, should insist that their proposal must not sweep away decisions
that even they do not expressly challenge.

Hayden's Question
In the 1954 debate in the Senate, Senator Hayden asked Senator Bricker
this question:
"If the words in his amendment: 'A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect' remove any
possible doubt as to whether a treaty must be consistent with the Constitution, then I would like very much to have the senior Senator from Ohio
say whether, in his opinion, if those words had been in the Constitution in
1920, would sound logic then have required the Supreme Court to decide
that the Migratory Bird Treaty made with Great Britain on behalf of
Canada in 1916 was in conflict with the Constitution, and, consequently,
that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 was unconstitutional."1
Senator Bricker replied thus:
"In my judgment the words would not, standing alone, because the
Supreme Court said very definitely in Missouri against Holland that the
treaty was in accordance with the Constitution because of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. It said it conformed with the Constitution, and
therefore it became the supreme law of the land. However, coupled with
the other sections of the committee text, there is no question that the doctrine of Missouri against Holland would not have become law. Missouri
against Holland would have been decided in another way very likely
under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
"The reason the decision created no more concern at that time was that
the results were salutary, and there was then no organized effort to change
the laws of this country by treaty, as there is today. That is the reason,
on the basis of that section alone-many people think it is importantit does not reverse the decision of Missouri against Holland to the effect
that a treaty is the supreme law of the land. The decision held that
a
16
treaty does not have to comply with the terms of the Constitution."
It is not pertinent here to consider all aspects of Senator Bricker's
complicated answer but the author of this article is unable to reconcile
satisfactorily the first and last sentences just quoted from Senator Bricker.
Nor can one be certain that the Supreme Court then or later would have
held the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act of 1918 valid by virtue of the commerce clause.17 The important utter15 100 CONG. REC. 1793 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1954).
16 Ibid.
17 Consider this subsequent statement by Senator Bricker: "However, under the expansion
of the commerce clause beyond all elasticity, I believe there is no question that the Supreme
Court today would have to decide the case exactly as it did then under the supremacy clause."
Ibid. But see Borchard, Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 Y=x LJ. 616, 633 (1945). Borch-
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ance by Senator Bricker, for the purpose of this article, is that he stated
that the section quoted by Senator Hayden would not, in his judgment,
8 If the reader will
have caused a different decision in Missouri v. Holland."
observe the language, the text of the section about which Senator Bricker
spoke is the same as the Bricker-Dirksen proposal except that the latter
has added the words "any provision of" after the words "conflicts with."' 9
Accordingly, American citizens are entitled to be informed whether the
Bricker-Dirksen proposal would overrule Missouri v. Holland.when in the
opinion of Senator Bricker Section 1 of the committee substitute for S.J.
REs. 1 of the 83d Congress would not have done so.
Holman's Views
The preceding examination of Senator Bricker's views suggests that an
examination should be made of the ideas expressed by Mr. Frank E. Holman who has had so much to say in favor of the proposal that it should,
perhaps, be called the Holman rather than the Bricker Amendment. In
1954, he wrote his "Story of the 'Bricker' Amendment," a paper bound
book distributed by the Committee For Constitutional Government, Inc.
ard refers to his studies, at Chief Justice White's request, to find authority for federal regulation of migratory birds under the 1913 law, before the Canadian treaty. He concludes: "the
study, which occupied several months, reached the conclusion that the states alone were the
repositories of the power to regulate migratory birds, since by no possibility could this migratory resource be called interstate commerce, which depends on the acts of man."
18 This view was stated again a little later more definitely as follows: "Mr. Hayden. I
made inquiry of the senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. Bricker), and he has assured me that his
interpretation of his amendment is that it would in no manner affect and would not have
affected the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Missouri against Holland if the
amendment had been a part of the Constitution in 1920.
"Mr. Bricker. I said that first section of the committee report, standing alone, would not.
"Mr. Hayden. What is there in the pending joint resolution that would affect the Missouri
against Holland decision?
"Mr. Bricker. The 'which' clause would reverse Missouri against Holland. That was the
intention of the 'which' clause. The intention was that treaties would not destroy the structure
of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States. This amendment would
not affect the result in Missouri against Holland as of that time. As I stated, in my judgment
the Supreme Court would sustain it today under an entirely different section of the Constitution, as it should have done at the time it rendered its decision.
"Mr. Hayden. The 'which' clause would reverse the decision in Missouri against Holland;
is that the Senator's statement?
"Mr. Bricker. Yes; the 'which' clause would have reversed the very theory or principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Missouri against Holland, and would have prevented taking away powers from the States and giving them to the Federal Government. It would likewise have prevented those powers from being taken away and their being given to an international body." 100 CoNG. REc. 1794 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1954).
19 It is also true that the Bricker-Dirksen resolution has added the words, "or other international agreement" to Section 1 of S.J. Ras., 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (the Bricker-Judiciary
Committee text). These words will be discussed later.
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On page 23 he referred to Section 2 of the "Bricker-Judiciary Committee
text" which was:
"A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty."
On page 26 Mr. Holman stated that the
"language of Section 2 of the Amendment-the famous 'which clause'merely protected the American people from an enlargement of the doctrine
of Missouri v. Holland (252 U. S. 416, 432) to the effect that the treaty
power may be conveniently used as a vehicle for the expansion of the
powers of the Federal Government-by first making a treaty on a subject
and then legislating without any constitutional restraint or limitation'
whatsoever."2
Mr. Holman also stated on p. 26: "Missouri v. Holland is the first
case in which the Tenth Amendment was squarely raised and held ineffective as against the treaty power."
While Mr. Holman did not write, as far as is known, that Section 2
would overrule, in effect, Missouri v. Holland, it seems to the author of
this article that his statement that Section 2 would "prevent an enlargement
of the doctrine" means that the decision would no longer be effective as a
precedent; it would merely remain as authority to support the particular
treaty and the particular statute challenged in that case. That is a comfortable position for reformer Holman to assume. It could be thought to
partly satisfy conservationists who otherwise might be against the adoption
of the amendment he favored. But it seems to this writer as uncertain
whether that assurance can be made by Mr. Holman or anybody else. Who
20

As far as the author of this article knows, there is nothing in any opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States that remotely justifies the last seven words used by Mr.
Holman; and there is language in Missouri v. Holland to the contrary.
Mr. Holman also wrote: "The doctrine that the treaty power is unlimited and omnipotent
and may be used to override the Constitution and the Bill of Rights (as Mr. Dulles himself has
said) is a doctrine of recent origin and largely derived from Missouri v. Holland." [Emphasis
added.] HouAN, STORY or THE "BRiCYcE" AMV[ENDMENT at 28 (1954).
In 1955 Mr. Holman published a pamphlet in which he expressed this view: "Any text of
an amendment to be adequate must protect the internal rights of American Citizens and protect the American form of government against the threat of treaties and other international
agreements. To do this the text of any amendment should provide as already indicated;
"(1) that no treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with any provision
of the Constitution shall be valid.
"(2) that no treaty or other international agreement shall be effective as internal law in
the United States unless implemented by legislation otherwise Constitutional." Horasus=, Tim
INcREAsiNG NEED FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDNMENT

ON TREATIES AND EXEcUTIVE AGREE-

5; reprinted, HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on SJ. Res. 1, The Senate Committee
on, the Judiciary,84th Cong., 1st Sess. 653, 657 (1955).
It is important to know whether Mr. Holman now thinks that the Bricker-Dirksen version
is adequate. His criticism of Missouri v. Holland on p. 13 of this pamphlet is very sharp.
MENTS,
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can be sure of the view of the Supreme Court on that question, raised perhaps many years after the adoption of the Bricker-Dirksen Amendment?
Later Mr. Holman on p. 41 entered upon a discussion of the Knowland
substitute, Section 1 of which was:
"A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. The judicial
power of the United States shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, in
which it is claimed that the conflict described in this amendment is
present."
Please observe that the first sentence of Section 1 of the Knowland
substitute is the same as section 1 of the Bricker-Dirksen proposal except
that the latter changes the words, "the Constitution" to "any provision of
this Constitution."
Concerning the Knowland substitute, Mr. Holman wrote on p. 49 that:
".... Section 1 of the Knowland substitute, standing alone, would only

protect the American people with respect to those matters that are
specifically safeguarded in the Constitution, such as freedom of speech
and of the press, etc. It would not protect the American people with respect
to the rights reserved generally to the States and to the people by the
Constitution. That is precisely why it was necessary to have Section 2 of
the Senate Judiciary Committee text, including [sic] something like the
'which clause,' so that, in addition to preventing a treaty from overriding
the specific provisions of the Constitution, a treaty should not have the
power of overriding the reserved rights under the Constitution or expanding the power of the Federal Government over domestic affairs."
In an address in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 6, 1953, Mr. Holman
stated: "Unfortunately, it so happens that the Knowland language fails
to protect the Constitution and the rights of the people as to their domestic
affairs." 2
The citizens of this country are entitled to hear from Senators Bricker,
Dirksen and their allies whether they now agree with the preceding view of
Mr. Holman; whether Section 1 of the Bricker-Dirksen proposal would do
no more than Mr. Holman stated; and whether the "etc." in the last quotation from Mr. Holman's book includes all that is in the first eight amendments to the Constitution, or all that is in the first ten amendments. If
anything in addition to the first eight amendments is included in the
"etc." the additional parts should be specified. In this connection it
should be remembered that, as far as this writer knows, Mr. Holman has
never stated specifically whether he desires to have the precedents cited
in notes 2 to 7 inclusive of this article overruled as ruling decisions. Neither
has he specified how it would be possible, in his language, to "protect the
21

Address -

Aug. 6, 1953.

54th National Encampment, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Milwaukee, Wis.,

Nov., 19561

BRICKER-DIRKSEN AMENDMENT

American people with respect to the rights reserved generally to the states
and to the people by the Constitution" without overruling these cited cases.

Dirksen's Views
It is likewise important to know the views that Senator Dirksen has
had concerning the various versions of proposed amendments concerning
treaties.
The Chicago Tribune has supported Senator Dirksen in his campaigns for national offices. Also it has vehemently advocated the "Bricker
Amendment" in its most extreme form. Its March 4, 1956 issue announced
the "new Dirksen-Bricker version" and stated concerning it the following:
"The amendment still would be effective in curbing encroachment on
states rights thru treaties and executive agreements, according to Dirksen.
One effect, he said, would be to nullify a 1916 treaty with Canada governing protection on migratory birds."
The Tribune also stated:
"The latest draft was put forward by Sen. Dirksen (R., Ill.) in a tactical
maneuver that may provide another senate test on the proposal to limit
the President's power to make treaties and other international agreements."
The expression "tactical maneuver" is not reassuring to this writer. He
fears that it is the equivalent to a "very slick trick", viz., to retain the
effect of the "which clause" without using it.

Kefauver's Dissent
A part of S. RP. No. 1716, submitted by Senator Dirksen, is the dissenting view of Senator Kefauver. He set forth the 1955 version of the
Bricker amendment as follows:
"Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement
which conflicts with this Constitution, or which is not made in pursuance
thereof, shall not be the supreme law of the land nor be of any force or
effect.
"Section 2. A treaty or other international agreement shall become
effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation valid
in the absence of international agreement.
"Section 3. On the question of advising and consenting to the ratification of a treaty, the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the
names of the persons voting for and against shall be entered on the Journal
of the Senate."
Then Senator Kefauver commented as follows:
"During the 1st session of the 84th Congress extensive hearings were
held before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on a ver-
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sion of the Bricker amendment which had been introduced by Senator
Bricker on January 6, 1955. Despite the objections of a number of constitutional experts, including the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State, this Bricker version was favorably reported to the full Committee
on the Judiciary by a vote of 3 to 2.
"However, this is not the version which is now being reported to the
Senate by the full committee. It was shelved in favor of the new version
introduced by Senator Dirksen. We believe that one cogent reason for
this sudden switch is that the Bricker version was so explicit that its dangerous consequences were obvious on its face, whereas the new Dirksen
version is so worded that its dangers are camouflaged.
"One thing that should be made clear at the outset is that only the
most meager consideration was given to the new version before it was
reported out by the committee. It first saw the light of day in a confidential memorandum distributed to members of the Judiciary Committee 2
weeks prior to their hasty consideration of it on March 5, 1956. The
matter was discussed only at an executive session of the committee. No
hearings were held either by the committee or a sub-committee. There
was no attempt to elicit the views of any constitutional experts. In fact,
the committee did not deem it advisable to withhold its decision regarding
this new version even long enough to' 22 ascertain the views of the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General."

The main reason for Senator Kefauver's dissenting view was stated to
be that the Dirksen version had added to Section 1 of the 1955 Bricker
version three little words, viz., "any provision of" before the words "this
Constitution." As thus phrased he wrote: "This proposed constitutional
amendment either does nothing or it does much too much;" 2 3 and, "What
is important is that the meaning of the words of the provision is far from
clear, their legislative history is fuzzy, and there is the danger that the
Supreme Court might give them an interpretation which, in practice, would
prove to be calamitous. 24
Hennings' Dissent
Likewise, Senator Hennings in his separate dissent wrote:
"The proponents of the Dirksen amendment have not made plain,
either in the majority report or in their public statements, what the Dirksen amendment will or will not do. They have even failed to assure the
country in explicit terms that under the Dirksen amendment the Supreme
Court's vital decision in the case of Missouri v. Holland will not be
trampled under foot .....
"Sound public policy is surely at war with amending the Constitution
unless the purpose and effect of the amendment are clear. The Dirksen
25
amendment is not clear. This is sufficient reason for not adopting it."
2S.
3Id.

R '. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 20 (1956).
at 22.

2

Id. at 27.

2

Id. at 1 of part 2.
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Three Little Words
The only statement found in the majority report S. REP. No. 1716that appears to explain why the "three little words" were added was this:
"During the debate in the 83d Congress fears were expressed that the
language quoted above, standing alone, might not afford any protection
at all against abuse of the treaty power. The fear was that it might be
legally impossible for the courts to find any conflict between a treaty and
the Constitution by reason of the suggestion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Missouri v. Holland that a treaty to be valid need only comply with
the formal requirements for treatymaking. The addition of the three
words, making treaties conform to every constitutional provision, makes
clear that a treaty is to be tested by more than mere procedural requirements." 26

The reference, in this passage from the majority report, was to what
was named as the Ferguson proposal of the 83d Congress, viz: "A provision
of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with this Con-,
stitution shall not be of any force or effect." 2T
If we accept this assertion concerning the purpose of the "three little
words", it would appear in the first place that that purpose, as far as
treaties are concerned, could be accomplished in clearer language by providing thus: A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution
shall not be of any force or effect even though the treaty has had the benefit
of all formal and procedural requirements, such as submission to the Senate
by the President, ratification by the Senate, and the exchange of ratifications
by the sovereigns who are parties to the treaty.
In the second place, the Bricker-Dirksen and the Ferguson proposals
apply to "other international agreement(s)" as well as to a treaty. Mr.
Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland wrote about treaties and nothing
about other international agreements. Thus the current proposal goes
beyond the correction of a suggestion by him. It would seem that a proposal fashioned on the supposition of the "formal requirements for treatymaking" is inappropriate if the purpose is to subject all international agreements to restrictive regulation.
In the third place, the Senate seems to be engaging in a very small
business if it is merely attempting to correct an observation or a doubt
expressed in a single opinion, viz., Missouri v. Holland.
United States v. Pink
Section II. A. 2, the majority portion of S. REP. No. 1716 discusses "International agreements" and there can hardly be a doubt that the major28
2

Id. at 7.
7id. at 7.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

ity of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary intend that their proposal, if
adopted, will demolish United States v. Pink8 as a ruling decision. Observe
this passage from the Report:
"As pointed out by the opponents of Senate Joint Resolution 1 so
often, the States of the Union are protected, in some measure, against
abuse of the treatymaking power by the respect for the rights of those
States among the Members of the Senate. However, the Pink case is a
precedent by which any President, merely by making an executive agreement with the head of any other government, could invade vital State
functions and prerogatives. It is extremely doubtful if anything would
have shocked the Founding Fathers more than the suggestion that the
Federal-State relationship was alterable at the will of a single individual."
Section II. A3. of the majority portion of Report No. 1716 is entitled
"Interpretation" and it is therein stated that "the committee deems it
advisable to set forth its conclusions with respect to the terminology of
the resolution as now phrased."29 In this third part the discussion sometimes makes no decisive discrimination between treaties and other international agreements. Thus please observe and ponder upon these two
paragraphs:
"It may readily be observed from the foregoing citations that there
are those who believe that there are matters of domestic concern which,
if dealt with by treaty, would constitute an improper exercise of the treatymaking power. The proponents of this amendment believe that it is desirable to incorporate such a concept in the Constitution itself so that there
can be no question that such a limitation exists. The language here proposed, that a provision of an international agreement which conflicts with
any provision of the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect, would
accomplish such a result, for, as far as the committee is concerned, a treaty
or other international agreement "conflicts" with the Constitution if it
does not deal with a matter of genuine international concern, or, to put
it another way, if it attempts to accomplish an internal reform by means of
an international agreement.
"In addition to the foregoing effect, the first section of the amendment
would also apply constitutional standards to executive agreements. The
decisions of the courts as to the effect of such agreements on Federal and
State laws are disturbing in their implications. The exact dimensions of
this effect are as yet unknown.""
These two paragraphs seem to disclose that the proponents of the
Bricker-Dirksen proposal somehow entertain a hope that section 1 of
28315 U.S. 203 (1942).
2
3

0

S. RET'. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Seas. 11 (1956).
Id. at 14.
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that proposal will accomplish what Senator Bricker in 1954 said that
section 1 of the Bricker-Judiciary Committee text ( S. J. REs. 1, 83 Cong.,
1st Sess.) would not accomplish but that section 2 of the latter (the which
clause) would effect.
Moreover, in the process of condemning United States v. Pink S. REP.
No. 1716 leaves this author uncertain whether the author of the Report
(presumably Senator Dirksen) also desires to make it impossible for the
result that was obtained in the Pink case to be hereafter effected even by
an orthodox treaty ratified by the Senate.
If U. S. v. Pink should be crushed by the proposed constitutional
amendment, the same is true of the majority opinion in United States v.
1 Both cases
Behnont.Y
tested the validity of an international agreement
between Soviet Russia and the United States, as represented by President
Roosevelt. Despite the vigorous assault on the Pink case and the dissent
of two justices in that case, this writer agrees with the decision of the
32
majority in that case and with the majority opinion in the Belmont case.
31301 U.S. 324 (1937). The decision was by a unanimous court even though three judges
were "unable to follow the path" by which the majority proceeded to its decision.
32
The statement that there is "no express constitutional sanction for the conclusion of
executive agreements by the President" plus the discussion concerning the Pink case and executive agreements in S. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1956), presents this sort of
a jumble to the author of this article:
(1) As for the Pink case, the "need for corrective action is apparent.'
(2) But under the Bricker-Dirksen proposal, the President can use either a treaty or an
executive agreement in making international agreements.
(3) The "President will be able to continue to use executive agreements to conduct the
day-by-day routine international business of the nation."
(4) "The amendment, however, will not permit an executive agreement to modify or override Federal and State Laws." But, "Presidential agreements may have effects on State and
Federal laws" .... (Illustrations are given.)
(5) "In addition, executive agreements may continue to be made pursuant to direct congressional authorization"...
(6) "With respect to agreements conducted by the President alone, if such agreements
involved a matter within the delegated process of Congress, and the agreement had not been
authorized by the Congress, it would be ineffective unless and until such time as Congress had
it ratified."
(7) Finally there is this amazing last sentence concerning Section 1 of the proposal: "If
State laws were to be modified or overridden, the agreement would have to take the form of
a treaty."
An excellent and useful article is Levitan, Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 35 Ir. L. REv. 365 (1940written, however, before the decision in U.S. v. Pink, note 28, supra).
There are many other books and articles worthy of careful thought. Only a few of them
will be cited: MCCLUSE, INTERNATioNAL Exxcurzvx AGREEMENTS (1941), reviewed critically
by Borchard, 42 CoL. L. REv. 887 (1942); 53 YALE LJ. 664 (1944). Sutherland, Restricting
the Treaty Power, 65 HAgv. L. REv. 1305 (1952); Chafee, Amending the Constitution to
Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv. 345 (1952).
Of those favoring the "Bricker Amendment" the best article read by this author is the
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It is certain that the treaty power may be abused. That is true of any
power vested in a government. The idea that we can have a constitutional
restriction on the treaty power that will automatically secure good international agreements but prevent abuses or ill-advised treaties or international agreements is a myth. Government is not that simple. As far as this
author has read, no reformer has advocated that the constitutional treaty
procedure must be used for all international agreements. It is recognized
that such a requirement would be thoroughly impractical. Congress has
frequently authorized the making of international agreements by the
President or by others under his control. Thus, the Congress has had
its part in the growth of a practice in this country that is contrary to a
literal reading of the treaty provision in the Constitution. That provision
has been expanded by this long accepted practice and thus it has come to
pass that we have four methods of making international agreements:
(1) orthodox treaties that follow the text of the Constitution literally.
(2) joint resolutions of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
approved by the President.
(3) Congressional-executive agreements where the Congress first authorizes by legislation and then the executive executes the authority by
making an international agreement.
(4) Presidential-executive agreements made by the President without
prior authorization by the Congress.
If there is need of a reform it should be carefully drafted because there
is a danger in using general expressions which may be interpreted in various
ways. Careful draftsmen likely will find it very difficult, if not impossible,
to draft a reform of our constitutional practice i. e., the customary part
of the treaty power specified in the Constitution, without endangering that
which is useful and even essential in the conduct of foreign affairs.
At any rate, the voting citizens are entitled to know whether the
plan to demolish the Pink case will endanger the fourth method of making
international agreements. If that is the purpose, it can be stated in clearer
language than that contained in the proposed Bricker-Dirksen Amendment.
Here is one way that such a purpose, it is believed, could be effected:
"No agreement that purports to bind the United States and another
sovereign can be effected except by ( 1) a treaty submitted by the President
to the Senate and ratified by it as specified in Article II of this Constituone written by Vermont Hatch in 39 A.B.A.J. 808; but he failed to discuss the decisions cited
supra; and his discussion of Ware v. Hylton, note 2, supra, seems unsatisin notes 3 to 7 incl.,
factory. See Ober, The Treaty Making and Amending Powers: Do They Protect Our Fundamental Rights?, 36 A.B.A.J. 715 (1950). His proposed amendments p. 796, among other things,
would save the guarantees of individual liberties in the first Ten Amendments "from substantial alteration by any treaty or executive agreement."
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tion, or by (2) a joint resolution of the Congress, approved by the President, with the power in the Congress to adopt the joint resolution despite
the President's disapproval as specified in Article I of this Constitution,
or by (3) the action of the President pursuant to a statute or joint
resolution that authorizes the President to make the agreement and only
to the extent that the President is so authorized."

A frank and specific avowal of what is wanted is needed!

17

